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CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
U.S. agricultural commodity price support policies have been proven a 
durable component of farm policy. The non-recourse loan, for example, has 
survived more than fifty years of farm bill debate. Price support policies 
have survived in part because they have adapted to changing circumstances, 
and in part because of the compelling equation of fair prices with a fair 
deal for the nation's agricultural producers . More recently, the growing 
influence of the nation's commodity producer groups has provided support 
for these policies. 
Despite price support policies' incumbent status, farm bill debate 
remains lively and broad . In 1981, Secretary of Agriculture Block proposed 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act which would have eliminated commodity 
programs altogether. However , Congress moved in the opposite direction and 
set loan rates and target prices on a path by which they would increase 9 
percent per year ( Reinsel 1989 ) . Preceding the 1985 farm bill, debate 
ranged from complete production and price controls through an international 
quota system (proposed by Senators Harkin and Gephardt) to direct income 
payments and the relinquishing of any control over crop production 
(proposed by Senators Boschwitz and Boren). 
In addition, the free trade negotiating position of the United States 
in the Uruguay Round of talks under the General Agreement of Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) implies that U.S. agricultural price support policies may be 
eliminated in the future. The U.S. cal l for the liberalization of 
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international agricultural trade is a call for the elimination of price and 
production distorting domestic agricultural policies (subsidies, levies, 
price supports, supply controls), in the hope that a liberalized trade 
environment will ease the burden of costly trade wars and domestic 
agricultural programs, and increase the volume and value of U.S. 
agricultural commodities traded. 
Typically, greatest attention in agricultural policy analysis is 
directed to the aggregate production and trade outcomes of current and 
alternative policies, while much of the rhetoric in policy debate involves 
the financial well-being of the farmer and the structure of the farm 
sector. With regard to international trade liberalization, the United 
States has not yet outlined a domestic farm policy consistent with the 
trade liberalization policy position it promotes in the GATT negotiations. 
With regard to decoupling, while claims are made about its impact on 
farmers and farm structure, there is a lack of studies of its impact at the 
farm level. While much is said about these two alternatives to current 
policy, little attention is paid to how 'we get there from here.' 
In order to support claims about the impact of decoupling and 
international agricultural trade liberalization at the farm level, there is 
a need for studies that consider individual farmer income, financial 
status, and production responses under different policies and associated 
market environments. This study provides a detailed farm-level analysis of 
the impact of the elimination of price support programs using a firm level 
policy simulation model of a corn-belt cash grain farm. 
Forecasts of U.S. and world agricultural trade by the Food and 
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Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) provide estimates of 
commodi ty prices under three distinct policy/trade scenarios: 
(1) continuation of current price support programs; (2) unilateral free 
trade involving the phasing out of all U.S. commodity programs; and (3) 
global free trade extending the elimination of price distorting 
agricultural programs to all the major trading countries. In the free 
trade market environments, the farm is simulated (1) with no government 
programs and (2) with a decoupled payment set equal to the deficiency 
payment received by the current-program farm. Thus a total of four 
alternative scenarios are compared current price support programs. 
Farm simulation brings into sharper focus differences between current 
price support programs and decoupling alternatives . Variables such as cash 
income, receipts from sales, cropping patterns, costs of producti on, long 
and intermediate term debt levels, taxes , family consumption and ending net 
worth can be calculated . Farm simulation allows the testing of claims of 
decoupling proponents that individual farmers will be better off 
financially without the r es trictions on production imposed by current farm 
programs. By introducing decoupled payments equal to the deficiency 
payment received by the current-program farm, the income and financial 
status of the farms under diffe rent policies can be compared given the same 
level of government expenditure. ~ile no current decoupling policy is 
represented explicitly in the farm simulation, the approach of decoupled 
payments is representative of the decoupling proposal of Senators Boschwitz 
and Boren in the Family Farm Protection Act (FFPA) of 1987. 
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Using farm simulation, this study provides a clearer pic tur e o f t h e 
implications of one type of decoupled agricultural policy . This s tudy wil l 
serve as a n addition to current analyses of alternative agricultural 
policies that consider aggregate production and trade outcomes . 
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CHAPTER II. 
CONTEXT OF THE DECOUPLING DEBATE 
Now woven into a complex web of supply control and surplus disposal 
and conservation compliance policies, price support policies seem a 
permanent component of U.S . agricultural policy. For participating 
farmers, commodity price support programs provide a significant addition to 
their farm income; for legislators, price support programs provide the 
carrot with which they encourage compliance with conservation practices, 
achieve limited control over surplus production, and continue politically 
important income transfers to agricultural producers. 
The initial emphasis and operation of U.S. agricultural commodity 
programs was on achieving income support and price stabilization through 
different calculations of price support levels based on the concept of 
price parity with earlier periods. Of interest in the decoupling debate, 
historically, agricultural policy has evolved by increasingly separating or 
decoupling income support from the price level. The Brannan Plan of 1949, 
although rejected by Congress, proposed "that prices of perishable 
commodities not be supported in the market, but rather that direct 
goverrunent payments be made to farmers in amounts sufficient to make up the 
difference Qetween the price received in the market and the support level 
specified by the Secretary" (Benedict 1953, p. 486). A major criticism of 
this early proposal for decoupling price levels and income support was the 
lack of provision for control over production (acreage controls or 
marketing quotas). The high guaranteed prices that farmers would have 
received under the Brannan Plan would have led to extremely high levels of 
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income payments from the government. 
In 1973, the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act instituted 
deficiency payments, defined as the difference between the target price 
(which was set to account for trends in domestic and world prices , costs of 
production, and supplies) and the greater of the non-recourse loan rate or 
the market price. Of course, if the market price was higher than the 
target price, no deficiency payment was necessary. As this was the case 
for most of the 1970s, the target price-deficiency payment approach seemed 
adequate and acceptable, and government outlays were relatively low . 
In the beginning of the 1980s, global recession coupled with high 
real interest rates meant a reversal of the market price - target price 
relationship . As market prices for agricultural commodities declined below 
target prices, costs of government support through the commodity programs 
increased. In addition, the high U.S. non-recourse loan rates acted as a 
price floor in U.S. markets and a price ceiling in international markets 
for a time under which competing exporters could outbid U.S. producers and 
capture market share. 
The Food Security Act of 1985, in response to these conditions, 
lowered loan rates. In addition, it added the marketing loan provision for 
cotton and rice, which extended the deficiency payment concept to include 
the difference between the loan rate and the market price if the loan rate 
should be higher , thereby encouraging producers to sell at market prices 
rather than defaulting on their loans and increasing the accumulation of 
government stocks. Each of these measures was intended to increase U.S. 
competitiveness in international markets . 
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This abbreviated description of the evolution of agricultural 
commodity programs in the United States, indicates the shift toward 
separation of income support and the price l evel. However, despite the 
trend toward separation of income support from the price level, a related 
shift or decoupling of income support from production of specific crops has 
not occurred. Neither target price-deficiency payment programs nor land 
retirement programs meet this criteria (land retirement programs because 
they remove land from production altogether). Yet since the 1985 farm 
bill, this kind of decoupling has been discussed with increasing 
seriousness. The motivation for this type of decoupling and the energy 
which has sustained it since the 1985 farm bill debate, derives from two 
different but convergent interests: (a) international trade 
liberalization, and (b) domestic policy reform. 
International Agricultural Trade Liberalization 
The current Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) involves multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) aimed at 
discussing and establishing agreement on ways to eliminate policies which 
distort international agricultural trade. The United States' forceful push 
for agricultural trade liberalization in the MTN is a bold and radical 
step. GATT's regulation of agricultural trade has been limited throughout 
the history of the GATT whose creation in the late 1940s was influenced 
largely by the United States . 
The GATT rules were written to fit the agricultural programs 
then in existence, especially in the United States. Since then 
the rules have been adopted or interpreted to fit various other 
national agricultural policies. So instead of developing 
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domestic agricultural policies to fit the rules of 
international trade, we have tried to deve l op rules to fit the 
policies (Hathaway 1987, p. 104). 
U.S. proponents of trade liberalization suggest that it would benefit 
many U.S. agricultural producers who are considered to be more efficient 
than some of their international competitors, and that it would lower the 
high cost of U.S. government programs which subsidize the agricultural 
sector. In addition, an intern~tional trade liberalization agreement is 
considered a way to avoid costly trade wars. 
International agricultural trade has been shaped by national policy 
makers responding to domestic consumer and agricultural interests. 
In both exporting and importing countries, agricultural 
production, marketing , and trade decisions have been 
increasingly separated from world supply and demand conditions, 
and based on domestic political pressures have become highly 
dependent upon government intervention. The result is a series 
of beggar-thy-neighbor policies, which have sharply increased 
the level of tensions in world agricultural trade ( Institute 
for International Economics 1988, p. 8). 
Nevertheless, motivations for current price and trade distorting 
agricultural policies are strong and varied: supporting farm income, 
promoting national food self-sufficiency, protecting a developing 
agricultural sector, and raising revenue through taxation of the 
agricultural sector. Yet trade liberalization does not exclude 
agricultural policies which may meet these same goals. 
It is important to keep in mind that, even in the presence of a 
free trade world, government policies for agriculture can still 
be justified (e. g., optimal storage programs and income 
stabilization mechanisms ); those who support the GATT process 
are generally in favor of government programs but would like to 
see those programs implemented which are neither output nor 
trade distorting (Schmitz 1988, p . 995). 
However, any success the United States has in the MTN will have 
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implications for current domestic agricultural policy. For example, the 
most recent U.S. submission to the GATT cal l s for the phased elimination of 
administered price policies , income support policies linked to production 
and marketing, and any input subsidy that is not provided to producers and 
processors of agricultural commodities on an equal basis (U .S . Submission 
to the GATT 1989). U.S. policy makers will have to determine what 
constitutes an economically optimal and/o r politically feasible 
agricultural policy under international trade liberalization i f it occurs 
through the GATT. 
Domestic Policy Re form 
Decoupling has become a well - known term with an unclear meaning. 
Many different policies are considered to be "decoupled . " The central 
meaning of the term decoupl ing is the idea that farm programs (income 
supporting or otherwise ) ope rate on a free market basis without changing 
producers and consumers incentives to produce or consume specific crops 
over others . Current U.S . farm programs, although farmers participate in 
them voluntarily , encourage farme r s to produce the program or price 
suppor ted commodities by increasing their relative returns compared with 
other non-supported crops . 
Domestic policy reformers who advocate decoupling fa rm income support 
from farm production consider current agricultural commodity programs 
inherently flawed . Critics of current farm programs liken current policies 
to driving a car with one foot on t he accelerator (target price and 
deficiency payments, and/o r high loan rates ) and the other foot on the 
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brake (supply control provisions). Rather than joining their colleagues in 
the process of tinkering with current price support and supply control 
legislation, some critics argue that a new basis for agricultural policy is 
required. 
Two examples in the 1980s indicate problems that can arise as a 
consequence of the operation of the programs . After rapid increases in 
demand for feed and food grains in the 1970s , U.S. farmers found themselves 
increasingly reliant on export markets . When foreign demand declined i n the 
early 1980s and farm prices declined as well, U.S. loan rates served as a 
price floor for commodities which foreign competitors could underbid to 
gain market share at the expense of the United States. 
The 1985 Food Security Act lowered the loan rate in order to regain 
U. S. market share. However, for feed grains and wheat, loan rates were 
lowered faster than target prices, resulting in rapid increases in 
government deficiency payments in the mid-1980s. These large deficiency 
payments also began to account for a greater share of farm income. For 
example, Figure 1 presents a graphical picture of the relative importance 
of government program payments in Iowa total farm income in the 1980s. 
Proponents of price support and supply control policy recognize that 
the above problems exist, but believe that solutions can be found through 
adjustments and additions to existing policy instruments. Proponents of 
decoupling argue that allowing farmers to respond to market prices and 
manage more diversified farming operations would prove to be a more 
equitable and efficient farm policy in terms of production and government 
expenditures. 
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Prospects for Decoupling 
Whether decoupling will become U.S. national agricultural policy 
depends on developments in two distinct but interrelated debates . Some 
analysts advocate initiating decoupling unilaterally as a strategy for 
pressuring other nations in the MTN toward trade liberalization . 
. . . U. S . bargaining leverage in Geneva [location of Uruguay 
Round talks] will be enhanced rather than weakened by domestic 
reforms which put added price and budget pressure on foreign 
competitors. It is by not taking such reforms that the United 
States will disarm itself in Geneva. Those who talk about 
postponing such reforms in order to preserve 'bargaining chips' 
in GATT are playing into the hands of protectionist farm groups 
at home that are opposed to reform under any circumstances, and 
which have little or no interest in a successful GATT 
negotiation . . . . Fortunatel y for the United States , in s ome 
important product areas (such as cereals policy ) , both the 
multilateral and the unilateral reform processes can be pursued 
simultaneously, and can be used to reinforce one another 
(Paarlberg 1988, pp. 130-1) . 
Some advocates of domestic policy reform, support unilateral policy 
reform based on their conviction that current U.S. agricultural policies 
are unsatisfactory regardless of the international trade and policy 
environment. 
Even if complete trade liberalization by all nations ultimately 
proved to be an elusive goal , the United States still would 
reap substantial benefits from unilateral policy reforms. 
Reduction in loan rates to levels that do not distort domestic 
production and consumption decisions would improve the U. S . 
ability to compete for any expansion in trade that occurs. 
Elimination of supply control programs also would reduce the 
incentives provided to foreign competitors to expand production 
and at the same time would enable U.S. agriculture to operate 
more efficiently. U.S . producers would no longer risk losing 
important new market opportunities because policies have 
created artificial shortages that other producers must supply . 
The United States would be able to use its competitive 
advantages in agricultural production and trade much more 
fully, allowing it to capture a large share of the growth in 
recovering world markets (Agricultural Policy Working Group 
1988, pp. 38-9) . 
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However, agricultural policy and trade analyses of unilateral 
decoupling by the United States indicate unfavorable results for the farm 
sector. A Wharton Economics study of alternative agricultural policies 
finds that unilateral decoupling would result in lower prices and lower 
farm income levels than a continuation of current programs (Wharton 
Econometrics, Inc. 1987, pp. 4.1-4.27). Similarly, a Food and Agricultural 
Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) study of unilateral (U.S. only) and 
global free trade in agriculture finds that unilateral trade reform results 
in losses in the farm sector. 
Under the unilateral option, most of the costs are internalized 
in the United States. Commodity prices and incomes fall, and it 
is likely there would not be sufficient savings in government 
program costs to compensate those who suffer the income l osses. 
The estimated cost savings are on the order of $5.6 billion 
annually, while the estimated income losses exceed $11 billion 
annually (Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute 
1988a, pp . 18 -19) . 
Different implications for decoupling hold if global free trade is 
achieved. In this case prices would be higher , and government savings 
would be greater than income losses to producers, thus allowing 
hypothetical compensation, and making decoupling a more palatable option 
for both government and farmers. 
FAPRI results show that in general price and trade outcomes estimated 
for global free trade compare favorably with projections for current price 
support programs. 
By contrast [with unilateral U.S . agricultural policy change], 
the global free trade option shifts a larger share of the cost 
to producers in other developed countries. The EC in 
particular would produce less and consume more at lower 
internal prices. The increased demand resulting from such 
adjustments leads to increased demand for exports from the U.S. 
and other exporting countries. World commodity market prices 
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increase, except for soybeans, which substantially reduces the 
income losses of U.S. producers. Therefore , in the context of 
a global policy reform, the U.S. cost savings of approximately 
$6 billion annually would be more than adequate to offset the 
net farm income losses of approximately $3 billion annually. 
In this situation, it would be feasible to design decoupled 
payment programs to compensate producers for income losses, 
should that be politically desirable (Food and Agricultural 
Policy Research Institute 1988a, pp. 18-19). 
Prospects for decoupling are highly uncertain due to the 
unprecedented level of exposure in policy debate and its linkage with trade 
liberalization in the MTN. Against decoupling are decades of dedication t o 
price support and supply control legislation, and, as yet a lack of a clear 
articulation of a decoupled policy , notwithstanding the Family Farm 
Protection Act (FFPA) discussed in the next chapter. 
The U.S . push for trade liberalization in the MTN is coming from the 
government not from the farmers. At the same time, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture has not provided leadership in the development of a domestic 
policy compatible with its free trade stance. Support for decoupling comes 
from an assortment of grain companies, farmers, and policy makers who 
represent a variety of concerns and motives for changing farm policy . In 
contrast, the Secretary of Agriculture considers continuation of price 
support programs as a signal of U.S. resolve in the face of the trade 
policies of other countries, particularly the European Community , and any 
lowering of farm income support as a signal to farm trade competitors of 
retreat (Des Moines Register, 1989) . 
Alternative Decoupling Programs 
Current decoupling literature includes a variety of policy 
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alternatives to price supports (Carr et a l . , 1989 , Agricul tural Policy 
Working Group 1988, Paarlberg 1988). Although decoupling is most often 
associated with the FFPA in the United States, decoupling has become a 
catch-all term of reference for any program which discontinues current 
price support programs in favor of a market-oriented policy . A partial 
list of "decoupled" approaches includes : 
* Providing income assistance in the form of lump-sum transfers 
based on past levels of support , such as freezing payments at a 
level provided in the past, and possibly phasing them out over 
time ; 
* direct compensation for reductions in income or asset values that 
may occur following policy r eform ; 
* transition assistance to help farmers adjust to alternative 
farming or employment practices ; 
* payments for socially- desired services, such as conservation 
practices; 
* assistance for market-based risk-sharing arr angements , like crop 
or income insurance; 
* investments in rural development and job creation (Agricultural 
Policy Working Group 1988 , p. 38). 
Some of the above approaches to decoupling phase-out government 
support during a transition to a market-oriented agricultural economy , some 
re-couple government support to specific farm activities, and some 
establish new compensatory mechanisms, such as expanded crop insurance 
programs or income insurance programs . 
The FFPA is an example of the first approach to decoupling listed 
above: lump sum income payments to farmers are determined in a manner 
mimicking current deficiency payments. Both these payments and 
restrictions on cropping patterns are phased out over a five year period. 
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Thus, the FFPA is intended to serve as a transition to a "free market " 
agriculture, rather than continue to s ubsidize agriculture indefinitely . 
As proposed, the FFPA is the most comprehensive starting point for 
analyzing decoupling . It is considered generally as the basis for 
criticism of decoupling and the point of comparison with current 
agricultural policy in the United States. A detailed comparison of the 
effect of current price support and supply control policies and decoupling 
alternatives with respect to income, production ; supply management and 
other variables is the topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III. 
CRITIQUE OF CURRENT AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AND DECOUPLING 
The decoupling debate in the United States involves two central 
questions: what are the impacts of the farm price and supply control 
programs on farmers production behavior? Does decoupling as generally 
defined mitigate, exacerbate, or neglect these problem areas? In this 
chapter, these questions will be considered from the perspective of 
economic theory, leaving aside the political considerations and forces 
shaping the decoupling debate. Specifically, a comparison will be made of 
the provisions of the 1985 Food Security Act and the proposed Family Farm 
Protection Act (as an example of decoupling with income support in the form 
of lump-sum transfer payments), and their respective implications for price 
and income stability, supply management, production, and farm income. 
The Food Security Act of 1985 and the Family Farm Protection Act 
The Food Security Act (FSA) of 1985 represents a continuation of 
commodity price support and supply management policies whose origins can be 
traced to the Agricultural Adjustment Acts of the 1930s. Basic policy 
instruments include: target prices and deficiency payments programs, non-
recourse loans, and Acreage Reserve Program (ARP) and paid diversion 
programs. 
These policy instruments are intended to support farm income and 
reduce risk by supporting and stabilizing commodity prices. The target 
price and deficiency payment provisions provide income support for farmers 
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producing program crops - feed grains, wheat , cotton, rice , tobacco. Non-
r ecourse loans provide a measure of protection against low and/or unstable 
commodity prices. Acreage limitation provisions allow the Secretary of 
Agriculture to limit the amount of land farmers may devote to program crops 
in a given year thereby offsetting the incentive to produce program crops 
provided by target price, deficiency payment , and loan policies . Acreage 
limitation policies are intended to mitigate price erosion or the cost of 
additional government storage from surplus production of program crops. 
At first glance, it seems that the FFPA has borrowed a lot from the 
current legislation . Non-recourse loans, marketing l oans , diversion 
programs , and payments to farmers are familiar policy ins truments . A 
closer, longer look reveals fundamental differences in how these policy 
instruments are used and how they interact with each other , implying that 
they will have a markedly different impact on the agricultura l sector. 
Tables 1 and 2 outline the major provisions for corn and soybeans , 
respec tively , of the FSA and the FFPA . The following sections compare t he 
commodity provis ions of both the FSA and FFPA , and examine the effects, 
intended and otherwise , of the respec tive provisions. 
Price and Income Stability 
In contrast to its predecessor, the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 , 
the Food Security Act of 1985 is dedicated to lowering loan r a tes and , mor e 
slowly, target prices, in order to make U. S. agricultural exports more 
competitive and to improve f arm income. Greater U. S. competiti veness in 
international markets is also the intent of the FFPA. The FFPA continues 
19 
the non-recourse loan, but at such a low l evel relative to market prices 
that its usefulness as a price floor in world commodity markets is limited 
to instances of extremely low prices compared with current levels . 
In addition, both Acts intend to reduce the price floor effect of the 
loan rate by the use of marketing loans. The marketing loan provision 
allows producers to repay their non-recourse loans at the lesser of the 
loan rate or the world price. The purpose is to reduce defaults on loans, 
which takes crops off the world market when prices are below the loan rate 
and increase government stocks. Farmers can continue to sell their crops 
on the world market and pay off their l oans at that rate. Marketing loans 
apply to rice and cotton under the Food Security Act, and to all program 
commodities under the Family Farm Protection Act . Again for the FFPA, the 
impact of this provision coupled with loan rates at low levels i s to 
maintain price protection at a level about equal to variable costs so as to 
prevent bankruptcy. 
Perhaps more importantly, it is questionable whether non-recourse 
loan programs qualify as "decoupled" since they are rela ted to t he price 
levels of specific crops. More suitable from the standpoint of decoupling, 
would be a net farm income insurance program , which would not affect the 
price level and risk associated with the production of any particular crop, 
but would provide some protection against unexpected price swings , etc. 
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Table 1. Comparison of policy instruments for corn 
Policy 
Non-recourse loan 
Loan rate adjustment 
Loan repayment 
(marketing loan) 
Target price 
Deficiency or Equity 
payment 
Food Security Act 
Based on a moving 
average of the 
previous five years 
with the high and low 
values removed. 
Secretary can adjust 
5 percent . 
Secretary can adjust 
by 20 percent if 
average market price 
is not 110 percent of 
the loan rate in the 
last year . 
Lesser of (a) loan 
rate , (b) higher of 
70 percent of loan 
rate or the 
prevailing world 
market price. 
$3 . 03/bushel. 
Target price -
(greater of (a) 
national average 
market price, or (b) 
loan rate prior to 
any discretionary 
reduction program) * 
program yield * base 
acreage. 
Family Farm 
Protection Act 
$1.30/bushel. 
Lesser of (a) loan 
rate, (b ) average 
world price. 
Not applicable. 
$1.04 per bushel * 
program yield * crop 
acreage base . 
Table 1. continued 
Policy 
Acreage limitation 
(includes set aside 
and paid diversion) 
Farmer owned reserve 
(FOR) 
Payment-in-kind ( PIK) 
Multi-year contracts 
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Food Security Act 
12 . 5-17.5 percent 
acreage limitation 
applied to farm 
acreage base in 1986, 
12.5-20 percent for 
1987-90. 
Not to exceed 15 
percent of the total 
estimated domestic 
and export use in the 
particular marketing 
year . 
A maximum of 5 
percent of the 
deficiency payment . 
Multi-year set aside 
contracts only. 
Family Farm 
Protection Act 
At the discretion of 
the Secretary of 
Agriculture to reduce 
total expenditure by 
the CCC and the 
Secretary . Not a 
prerequisite for 
receiving equity 
payments. 
If payment does not 
add to Federal 
outlays or lower ne t 
farm income. 
For two or more crop 
years , including all 
program provisions. 
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Table 2. Comparison of policy instruments for soybeans 
Policy 
Non-recourse loan 
Loan rate adjustment 
Loan repayment rate 
(marketing loan) 
Deficiency or Equity 
payment 
Acreage limitation 
Payments-in-kind 
Food Security Act 
Equal to 75 percent 
of moving average of 
the previous five 
years with the high 
and low valus 
removed. 
Secretary can adjust 
by 5 percent, but 
rate can not be less 
that $4 . 50 . 
Lesser of the (a) 
loan rate, (b) 
prevailing world 
market price. 
Not applicable. 
Not applicable. 
Not applicable . 
Family Farm 
Protection Act 
$3.50/bushel. 
Secretary can adjust 
by 5 percent based on 
market conditions 
during the two 
preceeding market 
years. 
Lesser of (a) loan 
rate, (b) average 
world market price. 
$0.80/bushel * 
program yield * crop 
acreage base . 
At the discretion of 
the Secretary of 
Agriculture to reduce 
total expenditure by 
the CCC and the 
Secretary. Not a 
prerequisite for 
receiving equity 
payments. 
If payment does not 
add to federal 
outlays or lower net 
farm income. 
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The experience of the last two decades shows increasing commodity 
price variability in the United States and international markets . Price 
variability has been the result of yield swings as well as forces and 
policies external to the agricultural sector of the United States . 
Cochrane describes price instability as inherent in world agricultural 
markets (Cochrane, 1979) . Cochrane considers three elements contributing 
to this price instability: (1) inelastic world demand for total grains; (2) 
unpredictable world annual variability in grain production (on the order of 
1 to 3 percent); (3) and the fact that the United States is one of few 
countries that maintains an open link with the world market thus its 
producers face price movements directl y. 
However, under current price support programs with target prices and 
deficiency payments, and non- recourse loans, the farmer passes the cost of 
price variability or downside price risk to the government. The current 
programs operate to insulate the participating grain farmer from 
international market price fluctuations: they can sell at market prices or 
if market prices are lower than the loan rate , default on their loans and 
receive the loan rate for the crop. Government payments to farmers and 
therefore the cost to the taxpayer can fluctuate dramatically depending 
upon worl d market conditions, and target price and loan rate levels. 
The lower loan rate of the FFPA increases farmers exposure to the 
price var iability of world markets as compared to the FSA. The FFPA , and 
decoupling more generally, has the opposite effect of current programs 
because it eliminates this buffer between farmers and world markets. Loan 
rates are set at low levels, close to costs of production, providing a 
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lower level of protection against price declines. U.S . farmers under 
decoupling will face the instability of world commodity markets more 
directly, and face greater downside price risk. However , it may be the 
case that farmers can compensate for this greater price risk through 
increased farm diversification , different marketing behavior , or crop 
insurance programs . 
If price instability in world agricultural commodity markets seems to 
be increasing since the 1960s, what are the implications for price 
instability under decoupling? Will price instability be greater or smaller 
if GATT negotiations lead to international trade reform as envisioned by 
the United States? Johnson ( 1975 ) compares historical price stability in 
the 1960s with variability in the 1970s, pointing out that reduced 
international reserves and the increased efforts of nations - such as the 
Soviet Union, the European Community, and China - to stabilize domes t ic 
prices in the 1970s contributed to increased price variability . J ohnson 
concludes that a liberalized trade environment reduces price instability by 
eliminating the shock applied to international trade when individual 
nations seek to protect or stabilize domestic markets. 
Concerning price supports, Mccalla and Josling (1985) show 
graphically that Johnson's argument holds for the single commodity case, 
but not, in theory, when multiple markets of linked commodities are 
analyzed. 
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On reflection this is an intuitively reasonable result . In the 
absence of intervention, the shock in one market is dissipated 
in all three markets . If intervention reduces intermarket 
linkages, more of the shock must be absorbed i n the primary 
market and less in other markets. Completely isolating markets 
forces all of the adjustment into the primary market. Thus it 
is not possible to say whether world markets of linked 
commodities with intervention are more or less vulnerable to 
exogenous shocks than in a free trade world. This result 
modifies the results in Chapter 2 (based on single - commodity 
analysis) that fixed-price intervention always destabilizes 
markets (McCalla and Josling 1985, p . 68). 
In single-commodity analysis, price supports have the effect of 
making an exporting country's excess supply curve less elastic, which means 
that international prices become more variable given exogenous shocks -
shifts in demand or shortfalls in production. However, when more than one 
market is analyzed the resulting comparison between intervention and free 
trade is less clear . Figures 2 and 3 (reproduced from McCalla and Josling 
1985, Figures 3.4 and 3.5, pp. 66-7) provide a graphical presentation of 
McCalla and Josling's conclusion quoted above using wheat and feed grains 
as example commodities. In Figure 2, the price support (PPw) creates an 
inelastic supply of commodity wheat in the exporting country (A), and a 
kink in the excess supply curve (E' 5 w) . This causes a lower world 
equilibrium price (P 'w). In addition, the increased production of wheat in 
country A, due to the price support, reduces the production of feed grains 
(Sra to S'ra), which competes in this example with wheat for production 
resources ( land). 
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Figure 3 shows that unless an exogenous shock (Edw to E'dw) moves 
world prices above the support price (PPw) for wheat, its production will 
not change, and there will be no interaction between wheat and feed grains 
markets. As a result, when multiple markets for linked commodities are 
analyzed, it remains unclear whether aggregate price variability is less 
under free trade or domestic producer price supports. 
Supply Management 
The FSA mandates idling of agricultural land through the Acreage 
Reduction Program (ARP) as a prerequisite for participation in the 
commodity programs (i.e., in the 1985 legi slation, mandatory base acreage 
reduction for corn is 12 .5 - 20%, 1988-1990). In contrast, the FFPA provides 
for a phasing out of specific crop acreage restrictions : "the producers on 
a farm may plant any combination of program crops so long as the producer 
remains within the total farm acreage base for the 1989 crop year" (Bill S. 
1725, 1987 , p. SO). Further, producers may plant nonprogram crops on 
anincreasing percentage of their base acres, beginning with 0% in 1990 and 
increasing by increments of 10% each year to 50% in 1995. 
While the FSA forces a reduction of planted acres in each of the 
program commodities for commodity program participants, the FFPA 
relinquishes this responsibility to the producer increasingly over time. 
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The FSA r e lies on the ability of policy make r s (Secr etary of Agriculture ) 
to foresee optimal acreage restrictions so as to avoid surplus product ion: 
In theory, acreage control and deficiency payment pr ogr ams can 
be operated so that idled acreage exactly offsets the increased 
stimulus afforded by the payment. The grain programs appear to 
have been operated closer to this 'ideal' during the first two 
years of the FSA85 than under any previous legislation . 
However, if unbalanced , these programs have the potential to 
stimulate production and lower marke t prices. Even in ideal 
circumstances, resource allocation is affected because 
producers are required to plant particular crops to reap . 
program b~nefits (Carr , et al 1989, p . 120). 
The FFPA allows agricultural producers to respond to relative market prices 
and under free market conditions economic t heory indicates that production 
of different crops will be balanced with demand . 
The income support under the FSA is based on production, but 
calculated according to specific formulas and subject to limi tations as 
shown in Table 1 for corn for example . Under the FSA, the farm acreage 
base, determined by a county committee, includes the sum of program crop 
acreage bases, the average acres planted to soybeans in 1986, and the 
average acres devoted to conservation uses in 1986 (S tucker and Collins, 
1986). The crop acreage base for a program crop - feed grains , whea t , 
cotton and rice - equals the average of the acres planted over the 
preceding five years (Stucker and Collins, 1986 ). The two measures are 
related in that the sum of the crop acreage bases cannot be greater than 
the farm acreage base. In addition , the farm program y ield ( also known as 
the base yield) is fixed or frozen according to the historical yield record 
of the farm . 
Increasingly, policy makers are concerned that current policies 
exacerbate or encourage the over -use of chemical inputs and fertilizers, 
30 
resulting in negative impacts on the environment. However, provisions such 
as fixed program acr eage and fixed yield provisions, limit or eliminate 
farmers' ability to increase deficiency payments by increasing input use 
intensity. Fixed yields and acreage reduce a farmer's incentive to 
increase use of agricultural inputs, since at t he margin the return on 
inputs per bushel above the fixed y ield level is equal to the market price 
or the loa n rate . Thus, the average price per bushel that the farmer 
receives declines with each addit i onal bushel harvested above the fixed 
acreage and yield limitation. In this case the farmer is better off 
reducing input use (and y i elds) or marginal cost to . the point where the 
marginal cost of the last unit of production above the program yield level 
is equal to the income from the sale of that unit, either the loan rate or 
market price . 
I f the program yield l evel is low, the producer ' s incentive to add 
inputs to boost yields on crop base acreage is dampened by the cap on 
bushels eligible for t he target price. If this is the case, then an 
additional effect of the fixed program y i eld is t hat it reduces the 
tendency of input costs (inc luding l and ) to increase with the targe t price 
level as described by Cochrane and Herdt (1976), that is premiums paid for 
land with base acres may be r educed as returns commensura te with its high 
yield poten tial are reduced . 
However, price support programs encourage t he continued production of 
corn, for example, which i s a heavy chemical user when grown continuously 
on the same land. Thus , the net reduction in chemical use may be greater 
resul ting from a shift to alternative cropping patterns than from the fixed 
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yield and acreage programs in current policy. 
In the FFPA, acreage diversion programs are continued, yet they are 
not linked to participation in commodity programs. Thus the Secretary of 
Agriculture retains some influence over the total crop acres by offering to 
make diversion payments high enough to encourage enrollment of land, but 
loses control over the area devoted to specific crops, such as ~orn or 
wheat as in the FSA. The usefulness of a diversion program for total 
acreage without crop specific acreage controls is unclear. On the other 
hand, without price supports the incentive to overproduce will have been 
removed. In this setting, acreage set aside or retirement programs can be 
focused on environmental objectives. 
International Trade 
Target price and deficiency payments, marketing loans, and 
discretionary reductions in the loan rates were intended to break the 
direct link between government support of farm income and commodity prices. 
In this sense, price support policy since the 1973 farm bill increasingly 
separates the market price level and the level of price support guaranteed 
the farmer. Continuing this direction of evolution in the 1990 farm bill 
would involve extending the marketing loan provision to all program 
commodities. The impact of these programs is not to reduce production 
distortion, but to decrease market price distortion and allow U.S . 
commodities to remain competitive in world markets. As Boschwitz (1987) 
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points out, separating target prices and loan rates can still create 
problems if the loan r ate remains above world market prices : 
Working hand in hand, price s upports and production controls 
have given our markets away to foreign competitors. Because we 
set our loan rates above world market levels and backed those 
loan rates up with production controls, foreign competitors 
produced more (surprise, surprise ! ! ). Our historic customers 
were drawn to cheaper sources of supply which we had 
essentially created by our protection of world prices . ... In 
1983 under PIK we laid aside 83 million acres. That year our 
world competitors increased produc t ion by 63 million acres, and 
once in the business they tend to stay t here (Boschwitz 1987, 
pp. 14-15). 
I n addition, during this period, U.S. market shares have been reduced 
because of foreign country subsidies on agricultural exports, and an over-
valued U. S. dollar, which implicitly increases the relative price of U.S. 
exports. In contrast to its predecessor , the Agriculture and Food Act of 
1981, the Food S~curity Act of 1985 is dedicated to lowering loan rates 
and , more slowly, target prices, in orde r to make U.S. agricultural exports 
more competitive. This is also the intent of the Family Farm Protection 
Act. With stable target prices, declining loan rates and increased price 
competitiveness in world markets carry a high price in terms of the 
potential cost of government commodity programs . During the last few years 
and in 1990 farm bill debate , increasing attention has been given to 
reducing these commodity program expenditures. Without being able to 
control world market prices , the United States' most obvious option is to 
reduce the level of the target price guarantee . Unfortunately, reductions 
in the target price levels directly decrease farm income. A side effect 
would be lower pa rticipation in government programs and therefore a 
r eduction of government control over supply and other variables (such as 
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participation in environmental conservation programs). Overall , the 
government's options under the current program involve trade-offs be t ween 
farm income, program costs, and international competitiveness. 
Under the Family Farm Protection Act, the government's role , ideally, 
will be reduced to making equity payments and fulfilling diminished 
responsibilities with regard to the use of farmland. The agricultural 
sector - farmers - will bear more of the burden of decision making and 
costs of adjustment to the policies - of other countries and world market 
conditions. In general, both the current farm program and the FFPA are 
dependent upon the same set of circumstances in international agricultural 
trade for their success. As described in the Economic Report of the 
President 1987: 
The effectiveness of the new policy (1985 Farm Bill] in 
enhancing exports of U.S. agriculture depends critically upon 
the responsiveness of export demand to price. The evidence 
shows that the short-run responsiveness of export demand for 
many commodities from the United States is relatively weak. As 
a result , the increases in export volume will lead to lower 
total values of exports in the short run because the fall in 
prices will be sharp enough to offset the increase in volume 
sold. Over the longer run, 3 to 5 years in the case of many 
commodities, lower prices can be expected to drive inefficient 
producers out of the market, force some government policy 
changes, and stimulate greater consumption, thereby increasing 
export sales at higher prices (Economic Report of the President 
1987, p. 170). 
Production and Crop Diversification 
Production distortion under current price support policies occurs due 
to the discouragement of complementary crop rotations such as corn -soybean-
oats and the rewarding of continuous corn or corn - soybean crop rotations 
(Duffy and Chase 1989 ). The production of continuous corn requires higher 
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level of fertilizer and pesticide inputs to maintain yields, and subjects 
land to a higher level of erosion than a more mixed cropping pattern , but 
current programs provide the economic incentive to follow continuous corn 
or corn- soybean rotations. 
In a decoupled policy environment, the goal is to allow producers 
complete freedom to choose crops and crop rotations without policy 
restriction. Producers would use all of their land and other production 
resources according to market price signals, not government target prices 
and supply control restrictions. In this policy environment, market 
prices, not policies, would determine t he emerging pattern of agricultural 
production , as producers would mix program and nonprogram crops in 
combinations that netted them the highest rates of return. 
'While no one knows what a decoupled environment in the United States 
would look like, the expectation is that farms would be more diversified to 
reduce price risk in a single commodity, and to take advantage of t he 
complementarity of certain crop rotations. Greater farm cropping diversity 
and/or livestock production diversity are the centerpiece of many of the 
claims of proponent~ of decoupling about the advantages of decoupling. 
Opportunities for diversification differ for different types of farms and 
farming regions. The kind of flexibility that Boschwitz envisions in 
statements about decoupling may not be realistic over a five-year 
transition period. For farms without livestock, it makes little sense to 
grow forage crops unless there is the potential to incorporate livestock 
into the operation. 
The high degr ee of specialization in agricultural production today -
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the high costs of specialized and efficient production equipment - may 
conflict with the expectation that diversified family farms can and will be 
the most efficient producers of agricultural commodities - able to respond 
readily to market signals and change their production patterns . An Office 
of Technology Assessment (1986) analysis finds that very large enterprises 
in corn, soybean, and wheat production have 11%, 1%, and 3% cost advantages 
over me dium-size enterprises (Chapter 8, pp. 161-186). If it turns out 
that a market-oriented policy rewards production efficiency and economies 
of scale, the FFPA may accelerate the concentration of agricultural 
operations into very l arge enterprises . 
Farm Income 
The calculation of the equity payment in the FFPA uses the familiar 
concepts of program yield and acreage base. The acreage base and the 
program yield for each crop on a farm are determined accordi ng to the 
provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1949. In terms of the 
specific implementation plan for decoupling production and income supports, 
the FFPA seems to be an evolution of present programs, in which deficiency 
payments are based on a similar calculation of base acreage and program 
yields. However, unlike the deficiency payment, which varies depending on 
the difference between the target price and the higher of the market price 
or the loan rate , the equity payment rate is fixed per unit of yield per 
crop (as shown in Tables 1 and 2, respectively for corn and soybeans). 
Also as proposed, the FFPA's equity payments , which "replace" the 
deficiency payments, are steadily reduced by increments of 10 percent over 
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a period of five years. Thus the FFPA intends that these payments only 
cover a transition to a market-oriented agriculture . Without any 
experience with such a policy transition, a more flexible schedule for 
determining equity payments may provide more protection to farm income 
during this period of uncertainty. 
Whether deficiency or equity payments, it is clear from statements by 
the Secretary of Agriculture that annual commodity program expenditures 
exceeding $25 billion will not continue . One question for decoupling is 
whether it will cost the government and the taxpayer more than current 
price support programs to maintain the same leve l of farm income. The 
formula for calculating equity payments outlined in the FFPA , suggests that 
the answer is a definite , "yes . " Government ability and commitment to 
maintaining farm income at levels comparable to current programs is an 
important criteria for support of decoupling . 
How to distribute farm payments equitably is not specifically 
addressed by either the FSA or the FFPA . Van Chantfort ( 1987) shows that 
mid-size farms (by value of sales) receive a disproportionate share of 
payments with regard to its percentage of total sales. Both the FSA and 
the FFPA put a cap on per farm deficiency or equity payments, respectively , 
but neither of these measures specifically relates payment levels to farm 
size or output. What the distribution of payments will be under the FFPA 
and whether it constitutes an improvement over current farm programs is 
another empirical question. Since the FFPA focuses attention on producers 
currently involved in commodity programs and r e lies on base acreage formula 
for determining payments, it is unclear how the distribution of payments to 
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farmers will be much different than that under current programs. 
It is important to note, however , that producer incomes under 
decoupling may be comparable to incomes under current programs , 
particularly in the context of international trade liberalization. Schmitz 
(1988) argues that theoretically, producer income (measured as producer 
surplus) could be maintained under international trade liberalization at 
levels comparable to current policies if price increases are sufficiently 
large or if government savings from the elimination of price supports are 
sufficient to compensate producers. For example, Figure 4 shows supply and 
demand curves under current price support programs i n the United States. 
Pr is the target price and P is the market price for the commodity, such 
that the producers are receiving area PragP in the form of government 
deficiency payments . Production is limited to quantity, Q0 , by acreage 
limitation programs indicated by the dashed line, C0S0 , and in this 
hypothetical example, acreage restrictions are such that Q0 is also the 
amount that would have been produced without price supports and acr eage 
controls as well, i . e., point g. 
If trade liberalization results in increased demand to FT1 , then 
production is Q1 and producer surplus equals area, PrbC, since acreage 
programs no longer apply. Producer surplus is therefore larger than 
producer surplus under current programs, PragC, by triangle , abg, and no 
compensation of producers is needed. In addition, government savings 
equals . area, PragP. However, if trade liberalization r esults in a smaller 
increase in demand to FT2 , then production is Q2 and producer surplus 
declines by the loss of government deficiency payments, PradP., minus the 
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gain in producer rent from increased production, deg. But even in this 
case there is a net gain from the trade liberalization - the cross hatched 
area, cegf. The cross-hatched area is the sum of government savings, 
P.dgP, minus the loss of consumer surplus, P.cfP, plus the increase in 
producer surplus from expanded production, area deg. In both cases, the 
compensation principle - gainers from a change in policy have enough to 
hypothetically compensate losers - is met. Schmitz concludes, "In this 
case, the motivation for free trade would have to come from the government 
because producers would be unenthusiastic knowing that there are no net 
gains for them -- there exists only a trade-off between government 
transfers and private rents" (Schmitz 1988, p. 998). 
However, Schmitz's theoretical analysis considers the aggregate 
market without taking into account changes in producer behavior. Farm-
level analysis takes into account the potential cropping cho i ces that 
farmers may make in response to decoupling and international trade 
liberalizat ion. What is missing from Schmitz's analysis is a perspective 
on the responsiveness of farms facing prices of different commodities 
moving in opposite directions under trade liberalization. Then producers' 
incomes will depend on their ability to anticipate and adjust to different 
market signals. Farmers may be able to maintain their farm income in 
different policy environments by employing alternative cropping patterns, 
input use levels, and changing investment and marketing behavior. 
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Summary 
Ultimately, a whole farm perspective is required to evaluate the 
impact of the government programs . The combination and management of 
agricultural policy instruments under the FSA as described above, address 
some of the concerns raised by proponents of decoupling . Nevertheless, the 
FSA , as an example of the evolu tion of the price support approach , provides 
evidence of the limits of and/or trade-offs involved in attempts to reduce 
distortions . Some critics would maintain that distortions are merely 
shifted by adjustments to current farm programs, not reduced. Maintaining 
international market competitiveness ( lower loan rates) and farm income 
( stable, high target prices) dramatically increased the government cost of 
the program in t he mid -1980s. Program acreage and fixed yields reduces 
production distortion somewhat related to the level of input use, but 
farmers remain locked in to producing program crops in rotations that rely 
more heavily on input use than alternative rotations. 
U.S . price supports and supply control programs involve trade-offs 
between production and supply control, government cost, and international 
competitiveness. Policies that alter price levels and returns for specific 
commodities alter producers' incentives with respect to those commodities , 
affecting production patterns, input use , and comparative advantage of 
production versus other countries' producers. 
Overall, decoupling as defined in the FFPA seems familiar because of 
the borrowing of the concepts of loan rates, acreage diversion, program 
acreage, etc. However, the management of these provisions and phasing out 
of decoupled or equity payments creates an agricultural policy far 
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different than the FSA. Compare d with the FSA , the FFPA increases the 
downside price risk that farmers face - unless it can be shown that greater 
crop diversification or other strategies can compensate for this risk. 
Other decoupling ideas involving expanded crop or income insurance schemes 
may provide greater price protection to balance the price risk implied by 
the reduction of the loan rate . The FFPA puts its faith in the farmer's 
ability to remain profitable given complete flexibility to adjust his 
cropping pattern and mix according to market signals . The equity payment 
is only meant to provide support during a transition between policies. The 
implications of decoupling (involving free markets and trans fer payments) 
for farm sector structure, cropping patterns, risk and farm income may in 
fact be quite different from the expectations of Senator Boschwitz: 
a good case could be made that our approach [FFPA] will 
bring about a revival of the small family farm. Diversity, low 
input costs, risk management, and environmental quality will be 
the emphasis of farm families rather than 'farming the 
government ' (Boschwitz 1987, unpublished analysis of Family 
Farm Protection Act, p . 7). 
42 
CHAPTER IV. 
FARM SIMULATION 
Simulation of all aspects of a farm over a number of years under 
current and free trade policy environments gives insight into the various 
claims of decoupling's proponents and detractors, and provides a level of 
detail unattainable in aggregate -agricultural production and trade 
analyses . Simulating corn-belt farms under current and free trade policy 
environments allows the testing of claims that farmers will be better off 
financially given greater opportuniry to adjust thei r production decisions 
to market prices . Further, simulating the total financial and production 
environment on corn-belt farms allows analysis of net farm income, ending 
net worth and/ or farm financial survival given different levels of transfer 
payments to decoupled farms . 
This chapter describes the model used for farm s i mulation (FLIPSIM 
V), the alternative policy and market environments in which the farm was 
simulated (FAPRI projections), and the characteristics of the simulated 
farm. 
FLIPSIM V 
FLIPSIM V is a firm level policy simulation model which was developed 
"to allow analysis of the probable tax consequences of alternative farm 
policies and income tax developments on typical or representative farms" 
(Richardson and Nixon 1986 , p. 1). The mode l i s described by Richardson 
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and Nixon, its developers, as follows: 
FLIPSIM V is a firm leve l , recursive, simulation model which 
simulates the annual production, farm policy, marketing, 
financial management, growth, and income tax aspects of a farm 
over a multiple-year planning horizon. . . . The model 
recursively simulates a typical farm by using the ending 
financial position for year 1 as the beginning position for the 
second year, and so on . The model , however , is a simulation 
model as opposed to a programming model . This is because 
FLIPSIM V does not include an overall objective funct ion to be 
optimized but rather analyzes the outcome of a given set of 
input data and assumptions for a typical farm. Accounting 
equations and identities constitute almost all of the 
computational components of the model. Virtually no 
econometric relationships with fixed parameters are included 
(Richardson and Nixon 1986, p . 2). 
An advantage of computer simulation is that it "allows one to 
incorporate the interaction between production, marketing, and financial 
activities at the farm level without specifying an expl i c it objective 
function" (Helms, Bailey, and Glover 1987, p . 787). The model simulates 
the farm without specifying one particular objective such as maximizing 
profit or minimizing risk . 
In this study the model incorporates a numbe r of diverse assumptions 
or decision frameworks which determine farmer behavior. Crop area planted 
is based on a profit maximizing linear programming matrix. Crop marketing 
decisions are based on keeping taxable income below a certain level . 
Family c~nsumption is based on a simple consumption function: ave rage 
consumption plus the marginal propensity to consume time s disposable income 
minus average consumption. Simulated farms experiencing financial 
difficulty may refinance their long term loans in order to cover their 
cash-flow needs. Similarly, farms with disposable income can accelerate 
loan repayments and further improve their financial position. Taken 
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together these behaviors or decision frameworks define the farm's behavior 
and performance in the simulation. 
Many studies employing the FLIPSIM model can be found in the 
agricultural economics literature, including studies of the impact of 
alternative farm policies on farm survival on Texas cotton farms (Duffy, 
Richardson, Smith 1984), of producers preferences for alternative marketing 
strategies (Bailey and Richardson 1985), of the impact of farm size on farm 
survival (Richardson and Condra 1981) , and of producer preferences for 
adoption of alternative practices under the 1981 and 1985 farm bills 
(Helms, Bailey, and Glover 1987). A particular advantage of the FLIPSIM V 
model is its extensive capabilities or applicability, as evidenced by the 
wide range of topics it has been used to study. This study takes advantage 
of FLIPSIM V's capacity to incorporate a high degree of policy detail, and 
to calculate a wide range of financial indicators. 
Specifically with regard to policy, FLIPSIM V includes all aspects of 
the current farm policy price support mechanism - target prices, loan 
rates , program yields and base acreage, set aside and diversion programs, 
Farmer-owned Reserve - making it ideal for agricultural policy comparisons 
at the farm level. The decoupling alternative was modeled by turning off 
or adjusting these policies instruments, for example, deficiency payments 
and set aside programs are "turned off." 
FAPRI Policy Scenarios 
Alternative agricultural policies imply different commodity market 
equilibriums and commodity prices. In order to simulate farm financial 
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status and production responses under alternative agricultural policy 
environments it is desireable to work with projections of commodity prices 
consistent with the alternative policy environments. Farm simulation of 
alternative policies without corresponding commodity price adjustments 
would yield distorted results. On the other hand , analyses of the impact 
of alternative policy scenarios on commodity market prices are not always 
available to the researcher, particularly the specific policies of 
interest. 
For the purposes of this study, a set of policy scenarios conducted 
with world agricultural commodity trade models provides a consistent set of 
commodity prices corresponding with current and decoupled agricultural 
policies. The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) 
maintains world agricultural commodity production and trade models with 
which it forecasts agricultural prices , production, consumption, and trade 
for a variety of countries and regions of the world. 
Ten-year projections for the U.S. agricultural sector and 
international agricultural commodity markets are produced 
biannually by the Food and Agricultural Policy Institute 
(FAPRI). These projections incorporate macroeconomic and 
financial forecasts from the ~EFA Group (Bala Cynwyd, 
Pennsylvania) and domestic and trade policy assumptions for 
major participants in world markets for feed grains, soybeans, 
wheat, cotton, and rice. The purpose of the FAPRI ten -year 
exercise is to evaluate the implications of current and 
projected policies of the United States and other countries in 
the context of likely world macroeconomic and financial 
environment (Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute 
1988b , p. 1). 
March 1988 FAPRI alternative policy projections were made for the 
ten-year period, 1987/88 to 1996/97 (each year designates a crop year). 
The macroeconomic environment for the commodity market projections is based 
46 
largely on projections of macro-economic variables made by Wharton 
Econometric Forecasting Associates (WEFA). International income growth, 
inflation and interest rates, and other macro-economic variables are 
important determinants of demand for and supply of agricultural 
commodities. With regard to income or gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
rates and commodity trade the general picture is as follows: 
The macroec onomic environment over the ten-year projection 
period contrasts sharpl.y with that of t he early 1980s . Then, 
low or negative real GDP growth was experienced in many 
countries. This low-growth period followed t he high- growth 
rates of the late 1970s. Although sti ll sluggish, the 
recovery of the world economies from the performance in the 
earl y 1980s has a significant impact on the level of demand and 
trade in the ten-year projection period. The rate of real 
growth, while substantially i mproved, is not as high as during 
the 1970s . Demand and trade recover from levels of the early 
1980s but do not approach the levels of the boom years of the 
1970s (Food and Agricultural Policy Research Ins t itute 1988b, 
p. 5) . 
In addition, "the purchasing power of the dollar relative to many developed 
country currencies is projec ted to continue declining , but at a lower rate 
through 1989 and then recover marginally thereafter" (Food and Agricultural 
Policy Research Institute 1988b, p. 5). The result is an i mp r ovement in 
the competitive position of the United States in its export markets. 
In the FAPRI baseline or reference projection, agricultural policy is 
assumed to be a continuation of the Food Security Act of 1985: "It is 
assumed that current programs will continue and will be operated with the 
objective of reducing stocks, remaining competitive in world markets, and 
reducing government program costs" (Food and Agricul tur al Policy Research 
Institute 1988b, p . 5). Specifically, during the projection period it is 
assumed that target prices will be reduced by 2 percent per year after 
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1990/91, and that the Secretary of Agriculture will not use his authority 
to set loan rates at higher levels than those established by t he decision 
rule of setting loan rates equal to 75 percent of a five- year moving 
average of the market price, excluding the years with the highest and 
lowest prices. In addition, the annual acreage reduction program for corn 
is reduced over time (from 20 percent in 1990, to 10 percent in 1991- 92, 
and to 5 percent in 1993-96). Paid diversion is eliminated altogether as 
additional acres are enrolled in the GRP. As intended by these policies, 
FAPRI results show declines in government commodity program costs. 
The motivation for the FAPRI alternative policy scenarios was to 
analyze policy reforms being considered in the GATT Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (MTN). The two policy scenarios are unilateral free trade and 
global free trade. In the unilateral free trade scenario, the United 
States eliminates all price support and income support programs , while 
other nations continue their agricultural policies. In the global free 
trade scenario, all nations phase out programs which alter the level of 
agricultural prices within their borders, whether the policies favor the 
farm sector or the consumer. In both policy scenarios, U. S. commodity 
programs - target prices, loan rates, annual acreage reduction programs, 
government stock programs, even ethanol subsidies - are phased out over the 
three-year period, 1989-1992 . In the global free trade scenario, 
protectionist policies are phased-out in other countries over the same 
period as well, by equating their domestic prices with border prices, as a 
result , "the level and fluctuations of world market prices are directly 
transmitted to these markets" (Food and Agricultural Policy Research 
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Institute 1988b, p. 12). In each of these fre e trade scenarios, U.S. farms 
receive no income support. 
Selected results of the FAPRI a lternat ive projections provide context 
for evaluating the results of the cash-grain farm s imulation. Figures 5 
and 6, respectively, compare corn and soybean market prices under curren t 
price support programs and unilateral and global free trade scenarios. 
With unilateral free trade , corn and soybean prices are l ower than under 
current farm programs . With elimination of annua l acreage programs and the 
r e l ease of stocks held by the CCC and in the farmer-owned reserve , 
production increases and increased supplies exer t a downward pressure on 
prices. Increased soybean production and consequent lower soybean prices 
are also related to the elimination of corn and wheat target price -
deficiency payment programs . Unde r global free trade corn prices a r e 
higher and soybean prices a r e lower than under current farm programs . In 
the global free trade projection , inc r eased demand from other countries 
provides a market for the incr eased U.S. supply and prices do not fal l as 
low and recover faster than unilateral free trade. Lower s oybean prices 
still occur, large ly because of substitution of feed grains for soybean 
meal in the European Community after the r emoval of price distorting 
policies. In keeping with price movements , U.S. c orn production tends to 
be higher and U.S. soybean production tends to be lower under g l obal free 
trade compared with current farm programs, and the r everse for unilateral 
free trade ( Figures 7 and 8) . 
The FAPRI free trade r esults a r e comparable with t he r esul ts of other 
similar analyses. A number of agricul tural trade analyses indicate that 
$2.25 
$2 
$1.76 
$1 .215 
Fi gure 5. 
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FAPRI corn price pr ojections for current policy, unilateral 
(UFT) and global (GFT) f ree trade, 1990- 96 
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Figure 6 . FAPRI soybean price projections fo r current policy , unilateral 
(UFT) a nd global (GFT) free trade, 1990- 96 
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Figure 8. FAPRI soybean production projections for curr en t policy, 
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commodity prices would be higher under trade liberalization compared to a 
continuation of current U.S . farm programs and trade relations (Krissoff 
and Ballenger 1987 , Tyers and Anderson 1986, Zeitz and Valdez 1986, and 
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute 1988a). Although , rice and 
sugar prices change the most, analyses estimate corn price increases of 4 
percent to 12 percent. Soybean price is estimated to decline by 2 percent 
to 8 percent. 
An important caveat to these projections is that they were done 
before the 1988 drought . The impact of the drought on U.S . stocks, 
management of agricultural programs , and prices , is t herefore not taken 
into account . More recent 1989 FAPRI projections indicate higher price 
levels for corn and soybeans, in part based on lower stocks-use ratios of 
corn. In terms of agricultural policy , the reduction of stocks and the 
higher prices may reduce the costs of government programs and make it 
easier to justify the continuation of current programs . Lowering the 
acreage reserve program in 1989/90, however , will have the effect of 
rebuilding stocks and lowering prices from the high drought levels . 
Reductions in government program costs may not be realized if lower ARP 
rates are continued because of the associated expansion of program 
production and deficiency payments (Food and Agricultural Policy Research 
Institute 1989) . In addition, these more recent projections assume that 
target prices are frozen at 1990/91 levels in the 1990 farm bill, rather 
than reduced by 2 percent per year as assumed in the 1988 FAPRI 
projections . Higher target prices provide a h ighe r l evel of income support 
and have the potential for higher government costs . 
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A second caveat is that the transition period in the FAPRI study from 
current to global free trade occurs over a short three-year period. In 
contrast, Boschwitz and Boren's current proposal for decoupling proposes a 
five-year transition period stipulating a gradual transfer of program or 
base acres to nonprogram crops. The latest U.S. submission to the GATT 
calls for a phasing out of undesirable policies over a ten -year period 
(Submission of the United States 1989). Compromise in the MTN of the GATT 
may involve incremental changes in international agricultural policy where 
some trade distorting programs are al l owed to continue. Such changes also 
would not occur over a short three-year period . The implications for price 
changes and commodity market behavior of these alternative paths of change 
in U. S. and international policy may be quite different than the results 
presented in the FAPRI projections. 
Description of the Simulated Farm 
The corn-belt farm simulated is a medium-size Iowa cash grain farm. 
The farm owns 150 acres and leases 280 acres for a total size of 430 acres. 
Of these 430 acres, 95 percent or 408 acres are cropland, the rest of the 
land is occupied by the farmstead, other buildings , and borders to the 
fields. The farm has 204 acres of corn base and grows corn and soybeans in 
a corn-soybean rotation. The initial debt-asset ratio of 0.30 i s 
representative of cash grain farms according to U.S . Department of 
Agriculture Cost and Returns Surveys (USDA, 1987). Off-farm income of 
$18,000/year is the equivalent of a teachers salary in rural Iowa. The 
simulated farm does not represent any particular Iowa farm. Rather, 
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specific characteristics of the f arm were gleaned from a variety of sour ces 
based on initial decisions about farm type and size. 
Cash grain farming represents a significant proportion of farm 
oper ations in the com-belt. The 1987 Agricultural Census of Iowa 
indicates that farms classified as corn or soybean farms (according to 
Standard Industrial Classification) account for 34 percent of all Iowa 
farms (see Figure 9). Farms classified as corn farms occupy 7 . 3 million 
acres or 23 percent of the 31.6 million acres in farms in Iowa according to 
the 1987 Agricultural Census (see Figure 10) . 
The farm size was chosen based on a review of Iowa agricultural 
censuses. Although the number of acres in cropland has changed relatively 
little (3.5 percent) in 33 years, the total number of Iowa farms has 
declined a more substantiql 34 percent (Figure 11). 
Figure 12 shows how the distribution of Iowa farms of all types has 
changed from 1959 to 1987. The most dramatic change is the shrinking of 
the 100-199 acre farms, followed by the loss of 50 -99 acre farms and the 
growth of 500-999 acre and >1000 acre farms. The census data show a clear 
trend toward larger farms in Iowa over the 28 -year period. (It is 
interesting to note that the smallest size category (1 -49) has not 
decreased as fast as the 50-99 category, giving the size distribution in 
1987 a bi-modal shape). Figure 13 shows that cash grain farms from 260 -499 
acres are the most prevalent . 
Farm size of 430 acres was chosen to be representative of Iowa farms 
and to meet two additional general criteria : that the farm would be (1) 
large enough to support a farmer without greater than 50 percent reliance 
Other crop 
15,598 
Beef cattle 
17,370 
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Hogs 
19,035 
Other l ivestock 
6,380 
Figure 9 . Number of Iowa f a rms by enterprise t ype, 1987 (Iowa 
Agricultural Census 1987, according t o Standard Indus trial 
Classification) 
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Figure 10. Land (million acr es) in Iowa farms by enter prise t ype 
( Iowa Agricultural Census 1987, according to Standard 
Industrial Classif i cation) 
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on outside or off-farm income; and (2) small enough so that a farmer and 
his or her family account f or upwards of 80 percent of the labor applied to 
the farm (thus representing a "family" farming unit). It is intende d that 
the results of the farm simulation would be r elevant for addressing 
questions about the well-being of the family or average -sized farmer. 
After determining the farm type and size , the r emaining 
characteristics of the farms were developed from a variety of sources: 
Iowa Farm Business Association summary reports and staff, Iowa State 
University Cooperative Extension Service staff and reports , Story County 
( Iowa) Assessor , local farm equipment and farm chemical dealers, and the 
Farm Tractor and Implement Blue Book (various editions ) . 
Because of the extensive crop budget, equipment, and other 
information requirements of FLIPSIM V, a detailed farm budget for the 
specific farm simulated was prepared using a program called Budget Planner, 
developed at North Carolina State University (Hoag, et al., date unknown). 
Farm operations, associated equipment, and seed , fertilizer, and chemical 
inputs, were identified for each crop in consultation with a representative 
of the Iowa Farm Business Association to match the size and type of the 
farm. The Budget Planner was used to calculate crop budgets from these 
outlines of cropping operations , equipment use, and inputs. For example, 
given the power , size, speed of operation, and t ypes of equipment required, 
the Budget Planner provided estimates of the aggregate fuel and lube and 
machine repair costs, and hours of labor per acre per crop. 
Table 3 presents the variable costs of production calculated for the 
simulated farm using Budget Planner and compares them with Iowa State 
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University Cooperative Extension estimates (Duffy, 1989). The simulated 
farm crop budgets are less than those estimated by Extension, by about 10 
percent for corn and 5 percent for soybeans. Accounting for most of the 
difference between the two budgets are lower fertilizer (nitrogen) costs 
for corn and lower harvesting costs for corn and soybeans on the simulated 
farm. The comparable corn yield for the simulated farm is 6 bushels/acre 
less than the yield used in the Extension estimate. 
Table 4 presents the machinery complement of the simulated farm. It 
was assumed that equipment purchases were spread over the years 1976 to 
1989. Similarly, the economic life of the equipment was adjusted so that 
equipment replacement would be spread over a number of years in a manner 
reflecting the farme r 's ability to finance equipment purchases . 
Farm Simulation Approach 
Current farm programs and four alternative policy and trade scenarios 
are considered in the farm simulation . The four alternative scenarios are 
described by the following matrix . 
No program 
Global free trade: 
Unilateral free trade : 
NPM 
NPU 
Decoupled payments 
DPM 
DPU 
NP and DP stand for no program and decoupled payment, respectively, and M 
and U stand for multilateral or global free trade and unilateral free 
trade , respectively. 
Decoupled payments in this farm simulation are lump-sum transfers to 
the farmer with no strings attached. The payments are intended to 
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Table 3. Variable cost of production estimates for corn and soybeans, 
Budget Planner and Iowa State University Cooperative 
Extension Service (Duffy 1989) 
Corn Soybeans 
Input Budget Planner Extension Budget Planner Extension 
($/acre) ($/acre) ($/acre) ($/ acre ) 
Seed $21.0~ 22 . 10 18.40 13 . 00 
Fe rt/Lime 45.90 50.80 25.05 27 . 90 
Chemical 17.80 18 . 20 15 . 02 16.40 
Preharvest 9.19 10.20 7 .49 9 . 50 
Fuel/Lube 5 .42 3 . 97 
Repair 3 . 78 3 . 51 
Crop 
Insurance 5 . 72 6.05 5 . 80 7 . 50 
Other 10 . 00 10 . 00 10.00 10 .00 
Harvest 21. 60 30.11 7 .10 11 . 44 
($/bu) 0 . 16 0 . 21 0.15 0 . 25 
(bu/acre) 139 145 46 46 
Labor (@$5 15 .40 15 . 00 14. 90 13 . 00 
(hours/acre) 3 . 08 3 .00 2 . 98 2.60 
Total Variable 
Costs 146.67 162 .46 103 . 76 108 . 74 
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Table 4. Financial information for machinery complement for 
corn-soybean farms (National Market Reports , Inc . 1987) 
Purchase 
-------
Replace-
Current Salvage Replacemt ment 
Equipment Year Price Mkt Val Value Price Year 
1/2 ton pickup 1984 $8,550 a $3 ,947 
Tractors 
130 hp diesel 
90 hp diesel 
41 hp diesel 
Tillage d 
MB plow (5 bottom) 
Tandem disc 
Field cultivator 
Row cultivator 
Rotary hoe 
Harrow spike 
1989 
1980 
1976 
1981 
1981 
1981 
1981 
1981 
1981 
Plant/Fertilize 
Planter/disc opener 1985 
(6 row) 
Saddle tanks 1977 
(2 @220 gal each) 
Harvest 
Combine (lOOhp) 
Corn header 
Flex platform & ree 
Barge (400 bushel) 
Barge (400 bushel) 
Total 
1982 
1982 
1982 
1980 
1980 
37,675 
22,550 
6,250 
4 ,000 
9 ,500 
7,500 
2,500 
2,000 
1,500 
9,924 
1,500 
36,950 
8,225 
5,875 
3 ,500 
3,500 
35,540 
17,575 
1,000 
2,000 
5,000 
4,500 
1,500 
1,000 
1 ,000 
6,500 
850 
28,825 
6,425 
4,575 
2,500 
2,500 
171,499 125,237 
$1,283b $9,489 c 1994 
5,651 
3,383 
938 
600 
1,425 
1,125 
375 
300 
225 
1,489 
225 
5,543 
1,234 
881 
525 
525 
37,675 
32 '025 
10,400 
5 , 500 
13 '000 
11,000 
3,800 
3 , 000 
2,500 
13 '000 
2 ,000 
46,100 
9,575 
7,000 
5,000 
5,000 
25,725 216,064 
2004 
1996 
1991 
1993 
1994 
1996 
1997 
1991 
1991 
1995 
1994 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1995 
1995 
a Average retail price of equipment at year of purchase. 
b salvage value is equal to 15 percent of purchase price. 
CReplacement prices for equipment are 1986 average retail prices 
for newer (larger) models of tractors or combine. 
d Purchase price and replacement price obtained from Iowa implement 
dealer. 
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supplement farm cash income, in particular as price support policies are 
phased out. This type of decoupling policy maintains the concept of 
entitlement - that producers are entitled to a certain level of income 
which the government helps to ensure. This is the approach proposed in the 
FFPA and probably the most widely known type of decoupling because of the 
efforts of Boschwitz and Boren to promote their proposal. 
In the farm simulation, decoupled payments are not tied to production 
in any manner , and are set at a level equal to the deficiency payment 
received by the current-program farm during each year of the simulation 
period as calculated by FLIPSIM (Table 5). Making the decoupled payment 
equal to the deficiency payment provides a means of comparing the relative 
farm income for the same level of government expenditure. For the sake of 
comparison , the decoupled payment calculated according to the formula in 
the FFPA is shown also in Table 5. The equity payment of the FFPA is 
considerably larger than the deficiency payment received by the current-
program farm. Decoupled payments calculated according to the FFPA imply a 
much higher level of government expenditure than under current programs for 
corn and soybean crops. 
The current-program farm receives a total of $43,408 in deficiency 
payments over the period. According to the payment scheme set forth in the 
FFPA, the decoupled farm would receive a total of $71,823 for the five 
years, 1990-94, for its corn crop alone, an amount which is 65 percent 
higher than the deficiency payment under the current program for the seven 
year period, 1990 -96. The difference is due to the policy assumption i n 
the FAPRI forecast that target prices would decline by two percent per year 
62 
dur i ng the projection period, and, mor e significantly, the generous formul a 
in the FFPA as described in Tables 1 and 2. 
In this farm simula tion , the farm change s the crop pattern but not 
the crop mix, an important and limiting assumption as compared to the 
flexibility assumed in the FFPA and for decoupling in general . In 
addition, the cropping mix is constrained in the linear program by maximum 
and minimum acres of corn and soybeans allowed . The maximum allowed acres 
for corn in any year is 306 or 75 percent of total acres, and for soybeans, 
273 acres or 67 percent of total acres. These constraints were imposed to 
prevent the f a rm from shifting abruptly from a corn-soybean rotation one 
year to continuous corn the next and back again , and to prevent the farm 
from planting only soybeans . These restrictions on the linear programming 
model are intended to impose greater realism to the cropping patterns in 
the absence of program planting restrictions on the s imulated farm. Since 
the model cannot take factors into account such as price and production 
risk associated with reliance on one crop , t he degree to which the farm is 
allowed to specialize in corn or soybeans is restricted by these external 
constraints . 
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Table 5. Deficiency and Equity Payments, 1990-96 
Deficiency Equity Equity - Equity as % of 
Year Payment Payment Deficiency Deficiency 
1990 $10,144 17,956 7,812 177% 
1991 9,897 16,160 6,263 163% 
1992 7,170 14,365 7,195 200% 
1993 6,928 12, 569 5,641 181% 
1994 5 , 648 10 ' 773 5,125 191% 
1995 2,930 ND 
1996 691 ND 
Average 6,201 14,365 8,163 232% 
Total 43,408 71,823 28,415 165% 
Equity payment as calculated in the FFPA declines ~en 
percent each year . The Equity payment shown is for corn only. 
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Realistically, farmers' ability to add a variety of crops in small 
increments is unlikely given the large incremental expenditures for 
purchases of specialized equipment, for example for planting or harvesting, 
that would be used for a small number of acres . However, cash grain farms 
could add wheat or other feed grains such as oats, barley, and sorghum, 
relatively easily. But the introduction of such feed crops, hay or other 
forage would most likely occur in conjunction with a shift to livestock 
production, not considered in this analysis, which would require a large 
capital investment, and significant change in farm operations and 
management. Such a transition to livestock that would take time to 
institute and may be considered risky in a changing and uncertain policy 
environment. 
In order to take account of the fact that farmers tend to set aside 
their least productive land, the FLIPSIM model allows the specification of 
a slippage factor. The net effect of this adjustment is a 4 percent higher 
yield on t he current-program farm in 1990 , a 2 percent higher yield in 
1991-2, and a one percent higher yield in 1993-97, compared with the yield 
per acre on the decoupled farms. 
If the farm simulation mirrors the aggregate government cost and net 
farm income results of the FAPRI gl obal free trade projections , the 
decoupled farm's income should be as high or higher than the current-
program farm's income when decoupled payments equal to deficiency payments 
are included. If the decoupled farm's income is higher than that of the 
current -program farm, it implies that the cost for this particular farm of 
maintaining farm income under global free trade through transfer payments 
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is less than through the price suppor t program. Making the same compar i son 
for unila teral free trade, the opposite should be the case: decoupled 
payments equal to the deficiency payment should not be enough to equalize 
the incomes of decoupled and current-program farms. 
In the FAPRI free trade projections, U.S. net farm income declines 
due to the loss of government payments. For midwestern cash grain farmers, 
lower corn and soybean prices imply lower sales receipts and lower net farm 
incomes, despite the freedom to plant additional acres. With corn prices 
strengthening and soybean price erosion in the g l obal free trade scenari o, 
the effect on the net farm income of cash grain corn -belt farmers is 
uncertain and may differ from the overall U.S. net farm income result . In 
either case, it is expected that net farm income and other financial 
indicators will show a poorer performance for the free trade scenarios if 
the farms receive no payments . 
Overall, it must be recognized that farm simulation in this case 
tests a specific farm on the basis of a particular projection of commod i ty 
prices. The commodity price projections in turn are the results from a set 
of commodity models derived from agricultural and economic historical data 
from the last two decades. Therefore these farm simulation results are 
presented as one picture of decoupling at the farm level. Simulation 
results presented here are subject to debate given the relative merits of 
the two sets of models ( FAPRI commodity models and FLIPSIM V) and, more 
importantly , the assumptions upon which they are based . 
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CHAPTER V. 
RESULTS OF FARM SIMULATION 
Net Farm Cash Income 
Table 6 presents a comparison of net farm income for the simulated 
farm under different policy environmen~s. On average for the period, farms 
without transfer payments or no program farms, have net farm cash incomes 
far lower than the current-program farm. Under global free trade, net farm 
cash income is an average of 72 percent of the current-program farm net 
income, and falls as low as 41 percent . Under unilateral free trade, net 
farm cash income is negative for six of the seven years of the simulation 
period, and is as low as -$8,513 in 1996. The only instance of positive 
net farm cash income under unilateral free trade and no program occurs in 
1993, when corn prices recover boosting receipts and interest expenses 
associated with debts remain at manageable levels. 
As prices improve in the FAPRI global free trade projection, the no 
program farm has higher net farm cash income than the current-program farm 
in 1995 by 14 percent. However, a higher level of debt interest payments 
and lower cash receipts reduces its net income the following year to only 
41 percent of the net farm cash income of the current-program farm. These 
adjustments in receipts and cash expenses are discussed in the following 
sections. 
The farms receiving decoupled payments have quite differen~ levels of 
net farm cash incomes with respect to the current-program farm. In the 
global free trade scenario, net farm cash income is consistently higher for 
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Table 6. Net farm Income for Simulated Farms, 1990-96 
Policy 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average 
CP 18,456 25,033 18,805 21, 133 16,793 13. 661 7,246 17,304 
NPM 8,263 15,712 12,024 19' 725 10,256 15 ,545 2,939 12, 066 
45% 63% 64% 93% 61% 114% 41% 70% 
DPM 18. 4.07 26,428 20,751 25,258 23,397 23,493 9,582 21,045 
100% 106% 110% 120% 139% 172% 132% 122% 
NPU (3,342) (1,543) (1 , 089) 5,869 (4,513) (2 ,631) (8,513) (2,252) 
28% 
DPU 6,802 8,898 6,888 13,417 1,096 3,985 (4,527) 5,223 
37% 36% 37% 63% 7% 29% 30% 
CP - Current price support programs. 
NPM - No programs under mul ti l ateral trade liberalization. 
DPM - Decoupled payment under multilateral trade libe ralization. 
NPU - No programs under unilateral trade liberalization. 
DPU - Decoupled payment under unilateral trade liberalization. 
Percentages represent ratio of alternative policy to cur r ent program. 
68 
the farm receiving decoupled payments. On average its net income is 22 
percent higher than that of the current-program farm, and as high as 72 
percent higher in 1995, given the recovery of prices in the FAPRI global 
free trade projection. In contrast, in the unilateral free trade 
projection, net farm cash income for the farm receiving decoupled payments 
is on average only 31 percent of that of the current-program farm. 
Comparing the unilateral and global free trade projections, the no 
program farm under global free trade fares better than the farm receiving 
decoupled payments under unilateral free trade. On average these farms 
respective incomes are $12,066 versus $5,223, and both income levels are 
less than that of the current -program farm , $16,875. These results support 
the conclusions of aggregate trade studies, that under global free trade 
government savings would be enough to compensate income losses of 
producers, but under unilateral free trade government savings would not be 
adequate to compensate income losses. 
Cash Receipts from Sales 
Average cash receipts from sales (total production for each crop 
times market price) were 14 percent higher for the farms under global free 
trade than for the current- program farm, but 11 percent lower for the farms 
under unilateral free trade (Table 7). That there is no difference in 
production behavior between farms receiving decoupled payments and no 
program farms is due to the fact that decoupled payments do not affect 
production decisions. In the unilateral and global free trade farm 
simulations, planting decisions are determined by expectations of relative 
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crop prices based on a weighted average of the past three years as 
described in the preceding chapter. 
Differences in the levels of cash receipts from sales are due to 
differences in the price levels and relative prices of corn and soybeans 
between the policy environments. As shown in Figures 5 and 6, prices are 
projected to be lower under unilateral free trade than for the other policy 
projections , and the corn/soybean price ratio is lower. As a result, under 
unilateral free trade, farms plant a higher proportion o f soybeans to corn 
than under global free trade. Different corn-soybean crop patterns are 
shown in Table 8. The relative proportions of corn and soybeans reflects a 
corn-corn- corn-soybeans rotation versus a corn-soybean rotation represented 
on the current-program farm. 
Another difference is the absence of acreage reduction programs for 
the no program and decoupled farms. In the free trade policy environments 
and in the absence of acreage reduction programs, farms plant all 408 of 
their cropland acres, on average 17 acres more than the current-p r ogram 
farm. As a result , even when the deficiency payment is added to the cash 
receipts from sales on the current-program farm, the no program farm under 
global free trade has a higher level of cash receipts (by 5 percent on 
average). 
70 
Table 7 . Cash receipts from Sales for Simulated Farms, 1990- 96 
Variable/ 
Policy 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average 
Cash receipts from sales 
CP 59,840 68,870 68,645 73' 712 73. 772 77. 327 80 ,472 71, 805 
NPM 63,521 77 ' 390 77' 890 88,000 82,493 93,019 87, 904 81,460 
106% 112% 113% 119% 112% 120% 109% 113% 
DPM 63,521 77' 390 77. 890 84 , 335 86,929 93, 019 87,904 81,570 
106% 112% 113% 114% 118% 120% 109% 114% 
NPU 51,916 53,337 58,429 67,054 68,948 70,340 74,046 63,439 
87% 77% 85% 91% 93% 91% 92% 88% 
DPU 51,916 53 , 337 58,429 67,054 68,948 70,340 74 ,046 63,439 
87% 77% 85% 91% 93% 91% 92% 88% 
Sales receipts· plus deficiency/decoupled payment 
CP 69,984 78,767 75,815 80,640 79 , 420 80,257 81,163 78 , 007 
NPM 63,521 77 ' 390 77' 890 88,000 82,493 93,019 87,904 81 ,460 
91% 98% 103% 109% 104% 116% 108% 104% 
DPM 73,665 87 , 287 85,060 91,263 92' 577 95,949 88, 595 87 '771 
105% 111% 112% 113% 117% 120% 109% 113% 
NPU 51, 916 53,337 58,429 67,054 68,948 70,340 74' 046 63,439 
74% 68% 77% 83% 87% 88% 91% 81% 
DPU 62,060 63,234 65,599 73,982 74' 596 73' 270 74,737 69,640 
89% 80% 87% 92% 94% 91% 92% 89% 
CP - Current price support programs. 
NPM - No programs under multilateral trade liberalization. 
DPM - Decoupled payment under multilateral trade liberalizat ion. 
NPU - No programs under unilateral trade liberalization. 
DPU - Decoupled payment under unilateral trade liberalization. 
Percentages represent ratio of alternative policy to current program. 
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Table 8. Corn-Soybean Cropping Pattern for Simulated Farms, 1990 - 96 
Policy/ 
Crop 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average 
( acres) 
CP 
Corn 163 184 184 194 194 194 194 187 
Soybean 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
MTL 
Corn 204 306 306 306 306 306 306 291 
Soybean 204 102 102 102 102 102 102 117 
UTL 
Corn 204 135 135 135 306 135 176 175 
Soybean 204 273 273 273 102 273 232 233 
Since decoupled payments do not affect production decisions, the 
relevant comparison is between the different trade scenarios. The t otal 
cropped acreage of the farm is 408 , the maximum allowed for corn is 306, 
and for soybeans , 273, as described in the text. 
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Cash Expense 
The greater number of acres cultivated on the decoupled farm on 
average also have implications for cash expense, including production and 
harvesting costs (including labor) and operating interest. Table 9 
presents the cash expense record for the farms for each year of the period. 
Production and harvesting costs are an average of 15 percent higher 
under global free trade, but only 2 percent higher under unilateral free 
trade , than on the current-program farm. These higher costs are due to the 
larger number of acres planted and differences in the crop mix under free 
trade. Specifically, under global free trade, the farms shift acres to 
more expensive to plant and harvest corn at $126 per acre. Under 
unilateral free trade, the farms shift to relatively less expensive to 
plant and harvest soybeans at $83 per acre, and thus the production cost is 
approximately equal to or lower than the current-program farm which plants 
fewer acres but more corn acres . 
A second category of expense, long, intermediate term and operating 
debt interest vary widely depending on the type of t rade liberalization and 
receipt of decoupled payments. The higher these interest payments are, the 
higher the debt on the farm and the lower the farm net cash income . Farms 
which receive decoupled payments have lower average total long, 
intermediate, and operating interest payments . And farms under global free 
trade have lower average total long, intermediate, and operating interest 
payments . 
Overall, lower interest payments are an indirect indication that the 
farm receiving a decoupled payment under global free trade is in better 
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Table 9. Farm Cash Expense for Simulated Farms , 1990-96 
Variable/ 
Policy 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average 
Production and harvesting (includes labor) 
CP 28,857 31,908 33,174 35,906 37,691 39 ,809 42,252 35,657 
NPM 32,014 37,639 39,154 41, 132 43,202 45,652 48,484 41,040 
111% 118% 118% 115% 115% 115% 115% 115% 
DPM 32,014 37,639 39,154 41, 132 43 ,202 45,652 48 , 484 41,040 
111% 118% 118% 115% 115% 115% 115% 115% 
NPU 32,014 31, 392 32 , 625 34,238 43,202 37,929 42 , 212 36,230 
111% 98% 98% 95% 115% 95% 100% 102% 
DPU 32,014 31,392 32,625 34,238 43,202 37,929 42,212 36,230 
111% 98% 98% 95% 115% 95% 100% 102% 
Long , intermediate, and operating interest 
CP 12,322 11 ,029 12, 721 11,982 12 , 876 14 , 227 18,553 13, 387 
NPM 12,601 12,393 14 , 709 14,687 16 , 091 18,327 22,377 15,884 
102% 112% 116% 123% 125% 129% 121% 119% 
DPM 12,601 11,574 13, 152 12,176 12,678 13' 309 16 , 425 13'131 
102% 105% 103% 102% 98% 94% 89% 98% 
NPU 12,601 12,482 15,562 15., 200 17,316 22 , 344 27,208 17,530 
102% 113% 122% 127% 134% 157% 147% 131% 
DPU 12,601 11 , 938 14 , 755 14,580 17 ,355 18 , 659 23,912 16,257 
102% 108% 116% 122% 135% 131% 129% 121% 
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Table 9. continued 
Variable/ 
Policy 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average 
Other 
CP 10 ,349 10,797 11 , 115 11, 619 12, 060 12,560 13, 112 11 , 659 
NPM 10 ,643 11, 646 12,003 12,456 12 ,944 13 , 495 14 ,104 12,470 
103% 108% 108% 107% 107% 107% 108% 107% 
DPM 10,643 11, 646 12 ,003 12,697 13,300 13,495 14, 104 12,556 
103% 108% 108% 109% 110% 107% 108% 108% 
NPU 10,643 11 ,006 11, 331 11, 747 12,943 12,698 13' 140 11, 930 
103% 102% 102% 101% 107% 101% 100% 102% 
DPU 10,643 11 , 006 11, 331 11,747 12,943 12,698 13, 140 11, 930 
103% 102% 102% 101% 107% 101% 100% 102% 
Total cash expense 
CP 51,528 53,734 57,010 59,507 62,627 66,596 73,917 60,703 
NPM 55,258 61,678 65,866 68,275 72,237 77 '474 84,965 69,3 93 
107% 115% 116% 115% 115% 116% 115% 114% 
DPM 55,258 60,859 64,309 66,005 69,180 72 , 456 79 ,013 66 . 726 
107% 113% 113% 111% 110% 109% 107% 110% 
NPU 55,258 54,880 59,518 61,185 73,461 72, 971 82,559 65,690 
107% 102% 104% 103% 117% 110% 112% 108% 
DPU 55,258 54 , 336 58 '711 60,565 73,500 69,286 79,264 64,417 
107% 101% 103% 102% 117% 104% 107% 106% 
CP - Current price support programs. 
NPM - No programs under multilateral trade libera lization. 
DPM - Decoupled payment under multilateral trade liberalization. 
NPU - No programs under unilate ral trade liberalizat ion . 
DPU - Decoupled payment unde r unilateral trade liberalization. 
Percentages represent ratio of alternative policy to current program. 
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financial shape than the current-program farm. Al l other simulated farms 
appear to be in worse financia l shape according to this indicator. Direct 
evidence of the relative financial position of simulated farms is provided 
by relative levels of debt, debt/asset ratios, and amount of principal paid 
on long and intermediate term debt . 
Other farm cash expense includes property taxes, other fixed costs, 
FCIC crop insurance premiums, and interest and storage costs. Differences 
in other farm cash expense are due to higher c rop insurance premiums and 
interest and/ or storage costs from the harvesting of more acres. Under 
unilateral free trade projections, the simulated farms pay little or no 
taxes because their incomes are smal l or negative. 
As shown in Table 9, the total cash expense is highest under global 
free trade projections primarily due to the higher production and 
harvesting costs. These farms have total cash expenses on average 14 and 
10 percent h igher than on the current -program farm. Under unilateral free 
trade projections, total cash expenses are 6 and 8 percent higher than on 
the current-program farm , primarily due to the higher t o t al inte rest costs 
associated with the higher debt on these farms . 
Operator Withdrawals 
Operator withdrawals include family living expenses, personal income 
and self-employment tax payments, and principal payments on long and 
intermediate term debt as shown in Table 11 . The amount the family spends 
each year i s determined using the following consumption function: average 
consump t i on + ma rginal propensity to consume * (disposable income - average 
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consumption) . In addition the simulation mode l allows the farm t o use any 
extra income each year to accelerate paymen ts of principal on its debts, 
starting with intermediate term debt. Thus level of family consumption and 
ending debt position are related to and/o r indicative of relative income 
received by the farms over the simulation period. 
Family consumption is highest for the farm receiving decoupled 
payments . under global free trade . Its total family consumption over the 
s imulation period is $147 ,678 or 6 percent higher than total family 
consumption on the current-program farm , $139 ,044. This same farm without 
decoupled payments maintains a similar level of total family consumption, 
$134,886 . On average under unilateral free trade, farms' total f amily 
consumption levels are substantially less than that of the current-program 
farm . However , it can be seen that the decoupled payment boosts family 
consumption above that of the no program farm. 
In keeping with their respective levels of net farm cash income, 
personal income and self-employment taxes are highest under global free 
trade and lowest under unilateral fre e trade . In parti cular, the farm 
receiving decoupled payments under global free trade pays hi~her taxes than 
the current-program farm . 
Similarly, total payment of principal on long and intermediate term 
debt is highest under global free trade and lowest under unilateral free 
trade. A farm's ability to accelerate principal payments is related to its 
level of income . Again , the farm receiving decoupled payments under global 
free trade makes larger payments of principal than the current-program 
farm, and has a lower l evel of debt at the end of the simulation period. 
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Table 10. Oper ator Withdrawals for Simulated Farms, 1990 - 96 
Variable/ 
Policy 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average 
Family consumption 
CP 21,164 23,202 23, 171 24,509 24,935 25,570 19,668 23,174 
NPM 19,635 21,804 22,154 24,298 23,955 25,852 19,668 22,481 
93% 94% 96% 99% 96% 101% 100% 97% 
DPM 21,156 23 ,411 23,463 25,128 25,926 27,044 26,160 24, 613 
100% 101% 101% 103% 104% 106% 133% 106% 
NPU 15,000 15,696 16,381 17,124 17,922 18,769 19,668 17,223 
71% 68% 71% 70% 72% 73% 100% 74% 
DPU 19,416 20, 782 16,381 23,351 17,922 18,769 19,668 19 ,470 
92% 90% 71% 95% 72% 73% 100% 84% 
Personal income and self-employment tax 
CP 1,500 2,587 3,012 2,009 2, 891 2,734 1,190 2,275 
NPM 1,500 726 1,255 1,124 1,528 943 1,142 1,174 
100% 28% 42% 56% 53% 34% 96% 52% 
DPM 1,500 2,571 3,255 2,376 3,397 3,167 1,830 2,585 
100% 99% 108% 118% 118% 116% 154% 114% 
NPU 1,500 0 0 230 716 0 0 349 
100% 0% 0% 11% 25% 0% 0% 15% 
DPU 1,500 0 0 230 716 0 0 349 
100% 0% 0% 11% 25% 0% 0% 15% 
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Table 10. continued 
Variable/ 
Policy 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average 
Principal paid on long and intermediate term debt 
GP 20,963 19,464 13' 726 16,765 12,275 9,866 12,161 15,031 
NPM 12,299 13 '401 9, 720 16,454 7,752 13 '259 10 ,312 11,885 
59% 69% 71% 98% 63% 134% 85% 79% 
DPM 20' 921 20,560 14,899 19 ,559 16,900 17,156 6,563 16,651 
100% 106% 109% 117% 138% 174% 54% lll% 
NPU 5,329 4,928 6,863 7,545 8,927 11,466 14,351 8,487 
25% 25% 50% 45% 73% 116% 118% 56% 
DPU 11,057 7,698 10,766 11,400 10,716 6,362 8. 777 9,539 
53% 40% 78% 68% 87% 64% 72% 63% 
Total withdrawal 
CP 43,627 45,253 39,909 43,283 40,101 38,170 33,019 40,480 
NPM 33,434 35,931 33' 130 41,876 33,235 40,054 31, 122 35,540 
77% 79% 83% 97% 83% 105% 94% 88% 
DPM 43' 577 46,541 41,617 47,062 46,223 47,367 34,552 43,848 
100% 103% 104% 109% 115% 124% 105% 108% 
NPU 21,829 20,624 23,244 24,899 27,565 30,235 34,019 26,059 
50% 46% 58% 58% 69% 79% 103% 64% 
DPU 31,973 28,479 27,147 34,981 29,354 25, 131 28,445 29,358 
73% 63% 68% 81% 73% 66% 86% 73% 
CP - Current price support programs. 
NPM - No programs under multilatera l trade liberalization. 
DPM - Decoupled payment under multilateral trade liberalization. 
NPU - No programs under unilate ral trade liberalization. 
DPU - Decoupled payment under unilateral trade liberalization. 
Percentages represent ratio of alternative policy to current program. 
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Total withdrawal -- for consumption, taxes, and principal payments on 
debt -- reflects the level of income of the respective farms. The farm 
receiving decoupled payments under global free trade has the highest income 
and the highest total withdrawal, higher even than the current-program 
farm . 
Long and Intermediate Term Debt 
Table 11 shows the relative levels of long and intermediate term debt 
on the simulated farms . Under unilateral free trade , the long term debt of 
the simulated farms increases. Because of low income , t he no program farm 
is forced to refinance its long term debt in 1994 and 1996 , and the farm 
receiving decoupled payments refinances its long term debt in 1996. 
With respect to intermediate term debt , each farm's intermediate term 
debt increases due to predetermined equipment purchases occurring over the 
simulation period. Only the farm receiving decoupled payments under global 
free trade can afford to make principal payments such that its intermediate 
term debt is consistently lower t han that of the current-program farm. Of 
note, ratios of intermediate term debt of no program farms and current-
program farm are highest during the years 1991-94, or the years in which 
the transition between policies occurs. 
Debt-Asset Ratios and Ending Net Worth 
Debt-asset ratios at the end of the period are highest for the no 
program farm under unilateral free trade (Figure 15) . Reflecting the rise 
in debt over the simulation period, unilateral free trade farms have higher 
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debt -asset r at i os than at the beginning of the per i od. The farm receiving 
decoupled payments under globa l free trade has a slightly l ower debt - asset 
ratio than the current - program farm . Ending net worth , unadjusted for 
capital gains, f ollows the same pattern as s h own fo r debt-asset ratios 
( Figure 15) . 
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Table 11. Long and Intermediate Term Debt for Simulated Farms, 1990-96 
Variable/ 
Policy 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Long term debt 
GP 65,590 64,378 63,051 61,598 60,007 58,265 56,357 
NPM 65,590 64,378 63,051 61,598 60,007 58,265 56,357 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
DPM 65,590 64,378 63,051 61,598 60,007 58 , 265 56 , 357 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
NPU 65,590 64,378 63,051 61,598 71 ,971 70, 106 94,414 
100% 100% 100% 100% 120% 120% 168% 
DPU 65,590 64,378 63,051 61,598 60,007 58,265 67,448 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 120% 
Intermediate term debt 
GP 
NPM 
DPM 
NPU 
DPU 
21,404 29,720 21,577 25,535 31,608 56,654 50 , 206 
30,068 44,447 40,310 44,578 55,175 76,828 72,230 
140% 150% 187% 175% 1 75% 136% 144% 
21,445 28,560 19,025 19,841 20,806 37,927 36,276 
100% 96% 88% 78% 66% 67% 72% 
37,038 
173% 
59,890 
202% 
54,354 
252% 
31 ,310 51,392 46,210 
146% 173% 214% 
60 , 239 
236% 
82,445 106,014 
26 1% 18 7% 
55,532 63, 166 
217% 200% 
91,716 
162% 
93,702 
187% 
84,847 
169% 
GP - Current price support programs . 
NPM - No programs under multilateral trade liberalization. 
DPM - Decoupled payment under multilateral trade liberalization . 
NPU - No programs under unilateral trade liberalization. 
DPU - Decoupled payment under unilateral trade liberalization. 
Average 
61,321 
61,321 
100% 
61,321 
100% 
70,158 
114% 
62,905 
103% 
33,815 
51,948 
154% 
26,269 
78% 
70,526 
209% 
60,596 
179% 
Percentages represent ratio of alternative policy to current program. 
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Figure 15. Debt-Asset Ratios for Simulated Farms, 1990-96 
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Figure 16. Ending Net Worth for Simulated Farms. 1990-96 
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CHAPTER VI. 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The following discussion of results focuses only on comparison of t he 
global free trade scenario (with and without decoupled payments ) and the 
current policy scenario. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, the 
global free trade farm without payments will be referred to as the no-
program farm and the farm receiv ing decoupled payments wil l be referred to 
as the decoupled farm. 
That the total cash receipts from sales of the no program farm are 
higher than the current-program farm (even when deficiency and dive r sion 
payments a r e inc l uded) is due to: (1) utilization of all cultivatable acres 
on the farm; (2) shift of two-thirds of its acreage into corn production; 
(3) recove r y of the corn price in the FAPRI global free trade scenario; and 
(4) dec lining target price level assumed as the policy for the current -
program over the period 1990-96. Increasing the current-pr ogram target 
price could equalize the cash receipts of the farms, but only at a higher 
cost to the government. For example, if the target price was assumed to be 
a constant $2.75 throughout the period, the total value of deficiency 
payments would be $60,880, or 40 percent highe r t han the total with 
declining target prices. Nevertheless, as prices r ecover i n the mid-1990s 
in the FAPRI global free trade projection , even this highe r leve l of 
support for the current-program farm is only just enough to equalize its 
total cash r eceipts with cash r eceipts f rom sa l es only of the no-program 
and decoupled farms. 
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Harvesting more acres, the no-program and decoupled farms' production 
costs total more than the current-program farm. The result for the no-
program farm is lower net farm cash income, but for the decoupled farm, 
higher net farm cash income than the current-program farm . That the net 
farm cash income on the current-program farm is higher than on the no-
program farm reflects the balance between policies and price projections 
for the current farm program and global free trade. These results suggest 
that market prices higher than those in the FAPRI global free trade 
projections are necessary for the no-program cash grain farm to attain 
income parity with the current-program farm. 
In addition, without transfer payments or a higher market price, the 
no-program farm accumulates a substantially higher level of debt than the 
current-program farm: 44 percent higher at the end of the simulation period 
in 1996. As a result, the no-program farm has the added financial burden 
of higher annual interest costs: on average 19 percent higher than on the 
current-program farm. These interest costs further reduce the no-program 
farm's net farm income relative to the current-program farm. 
In contrast, receiving a transfer payment clearly increases the 
simulated farm's net cash income. The increase is greater than one dollar 
of net income per dollar of transfer payment. If the decoupled payment 
were subtracted from the net cash income of the decoupled farm, its 
resulting farm income would be slightly higher on average than that of the 
no-program farm, and yet be lower on average than the income of the 
current -program farm . 
The reason that the transfer payment can be more than merely an 
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addition to net income is due to differences in behavior between the 
decoupled farm and the no-program farm. Specifically, the decoupled farm 
in t his case obtains a slight net gain in cash receipts from shifting the 
sale of a highe r proportion of crop production to the next tax year for 
which, in this simulation, it receives a more favorable price. That the 
transfer payments may result in the decoupled farms obtaining additional 
income through more flexible marketing dec i sions is overlooked in simple 
comparisons of decoupled and current programs. 
Theoretical analyses such as Schmitz show that it may be possible to 
compensate producers under international trade liberalization from the 
savings accruing to (1) the government from the elimination of commodity 
programs, and (2) consumers from lower market prices. Aggregate analyses 
of world agricultural commodity markets, such as the FAPRI evaluation of 
global free trade, provide some empirical support for this theoretical 
hypothesis. The results of this farm simulation also provide support at 
the farm level for Schmitz's theoretical analysis. 
Referring again to the example where target prices are increased to 
the $2.75 level throughout the simulation period, average net farm cash 
incomes are about equal for the current program ($20,266) and the decoupled 
farm ($21,045). This comparison suggests the r obustness of the relative 
results to assumptions about changes in po l icy. Thus while it is extremely 
unlikely that transfers of income the size of those suggested by the FFPA 
will be polit i cally feasible or affordable, this study indicates that 
payments of a lesser magnitude may provide adequate income protection 
relative to current program projected net farm cash income. 
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Farm level simulation allows a closer look at the impact of the 
decoupled payment on the farm's financial condition. In this case, a 
decoupled payment e qua l t o t he deficiency payment rece i ved by the current -
progr am f a rm enables the decouple d f a rm to end i n better financial 
condition than the current -program f a rm. The s pecific impl ication is t hat 
a s ma lle r government outlay is needed i n a decoupled policy environment 
under global f r ee trade t o ach ieve the same level of financia l well -being 
fo r chis par cicular t ype and size of fa r m as under current price support 
pr ograms. 
Of course, numer ous caveats must be considered regarding these 
simulation results : 
(1 ) uncertainty about r educ tions in yie l ds on the decoupled farm 
assoc ia t ed with plant ing t h e f or merly se t aside ac r eage; 
(2) impac t on producer behavior of greater downside price risk in the 
decoup l ed policy environmen t ; 
(3) speculat i on about t he level of price instability under global 
free t r ade; 
(4) commodi ty price l evels may differ from the FAPRI projections 
(higher or lower ), particularly regarding the assumption about the 
speed of trans i tion (thr ee years) to free trade; and 
(5) the r esults for a s pecific size and type of fa r m are not 
r epr esen ta t i ve of other types of f a r ms o r possible to aggregate due 
to the different farm types , fa r me r res ponses t o policy change , and 
different price movements assoc i ated wi t h other commodi ties in the 
FAPRI proj ections . 
Lower average farm yields f or decoup l e d f a rms, e.g. t h e planting of 
formerl y idle d a nd less productive acr es, would of course r educe cash 
receipts from sales and i ncome. On the other hand, adding nitrogen fixing 
crops to the rotation coul d have the effect of boosting corn yields on the 
decoupled farm. Greater price instability and the greater downside pr i ce 
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risk will have uncertain implications for behavior: to what extent can and 
will farmers change input use patterns, cropping patterns, and alter 
marketing strategies? A slower transition (a ten-year phase out period has 
been proposed by the United States in the GATT negotiations ) implies a 
smoother adjustment in international markets and perhaps higher average 
price levels throughout . This would indicate that relatively lower levels 
of decoupled payments may provide adequate income protection/support during 
this period, if the same assumptions about the macro-economy hold as in the 
FAPRI projections. Finally, these results should be considered a point of 
comparison for other cash grain, corn-soybean farms , requiring adjustments 
for size of operation and associated economies of scale, etc. A valuable 
extension of these results would be the inclusion of livestock activities 
and the associated expansion of cropping activities to include forages, 
oats, and barley , for on-farm feeding. 
Overall, the farm simulation approach represented in this study 
offers a more comprehensive look at the relative financial condition of 
price support and decoupled farms in their respective policy and market 
environments over a multi-year time horizon. Included are important 
behavioral and financial variables left out of more simplistic, single-
year comparisons of decoupled and price support policies: changes in 
production patterns, marketing behavior, taxes, level of debt and interest 
payments, prepayment of debt, family consumption (marginal propensity to 
consume additional disposable income), and ending farm net worth. 
The farm simulation results are not optimistic for unilateral free 
trade scenarios , even including decoupled payments. Global free trade in 
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agriculture may be achieved through agreements in the GATT negotiations. 
Success in these negotiations would begin a new era for agricultural trade 
and direct unprecedented changes in U.S. and other countries' agricultural 
policies. Of primary interest in this study is the confirmation of the 
potential for attaining/maintaining comparable levels of farm income with 
reasonable (by 1980 standards) levels of government outlays, in this case 
in the form of decoupled payments to certain producers. Thus the farm 
simulation analysis conducted in this study provides an additional and 
unique perspective in the debate about the relative merits of decoupling 
and its presumed impacts on agriculture. 
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